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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
ADvsru;it Possts~ION-MISTAKE.-From a decree quieting in plaintiff title 
by adverse possession, defendants appealed, contending thal: plaintiff claimed 
the land only under and by virtue of a will which in fact conferred no legal 
title, and that such a claim was not adverse. Held, assuming that plaintiff 
believed he was asserting legal rights only, and that his claim of title was 
defective, his possession would nevertheless ripen into title by adverse pos-
session. Erickson v. Crosby, (Neb. 1916) 16o N. W. 94-
Slightly different facts raised a somewhat similar question in another 
jurisdiction. In a suit to quiet title, plaintiff sought to show that he and 
his predecessor had held the land adversely for the statutory period. It ap-
peared . that plaintiff's grantor had occupied the land in question under a 
mistake as to his true boundary line. Held, obe who by mistake as to the true 
line occupies beyond it, claiming a right only to the true line, does not occupy 
adversely to the actual owner. Jahnke v. Seydel, (Ia. 1916) 159 N. W. g86. 
The courts do not differ as to the elements necessary to rendar the claim 
and possession of land adverse to the true owner. Theoretically the occu-
pant must claim the land as his own ·in either jurisdiction. Where a mis-
take is shown, the question becomes a hypothetical one. Would the occu-. 
pant have held the land as his own if he had known that his legal claim tO' 
it was without foundation? The Nebraska court presumes the affirmative 
of this proposition; the Iowa court, the negative. The particular presump-
tion adopted, although rebuttable, invariably controls the decision. The great 
weight of authority supports the rule applied in Nebraska. The recent case 
of Janke v. McMahon, 21 Calif. App. 781,:.i33 Pac. 21, accords with the Iowa 
case. For other cases, and an analysis of the question, see II Mic:a:. L. 
~. 57. 
ANNUU.MltNT OF MARRIAGJ;-INR~NT POWERS OF EQUITY TO GRANT.-The 
defendant had been divorced from a former husband on the grounds of 
adultery, the statute providing that the guilty party should not m.arry again 
during the life of the other party without the consent of the court given 
under certain conditions, and such remarriage should be absolutely void. 
The ·defendant married the plaintiff without the consent of the court. Upon 
discovery of the facts above the husband, the plaintiff, 'sued for annullment. 
Held, that the marriage should be annulled. Roth v. Roth (1916), 161 N. 
Y. Supp. gg. 
The case raises the interesting question whether a court of equity has 
inherent power to annul a marriage which is absolutely void under the 
s~fllte. The couit says that it has, but prefers to base its holding upon the 
statutory ground of fraud, which existed in this case. Peugnet v. Phelps, 
48 Barb. 566, under facts practically identical with those in "the principal case, 
except that the husband in that case knew of his wife's statutory disability 
before marriage holds that the court had no inherent power to annull 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS 343 
the marriage even though it were void under the statute and so annullment 
was refused in that case. In many cases the New York courts have been 
quite ready to interfere with the marriage relation upon the ground of gen-
eral equity jurisdiction. It was declared in early cases that the court of 
chancery might annull marriages on the grounds of insanity and fraud with-
out statutory warrant. Wightman v. Wightman, S Johns. Ch. 343; Ferlat 
v. Gojon, I Hopk. Ch. 478. In Burtis v. Burtis, I Hopk. Ch. 557, the general 
jurisdiction of the court of equity to annull marriages was restricted by hold-
ing that it extended only to matters' affecting, contracts in general and <!id 
not include the powers of the English Ecclesisatical courts. This lias since 
been the rule in New .York. Dam0dson v. Ream, 161 N. Y. Supp. 73. In 
Griffin v. Griffin, 47 ~. Y. 134, the wife was given counsel fees by the court 
under its inherent power as a court of equity without statutory warrant 
where her husband had sued to annull the marriage and had failed to estab-
lish his case. In Berry v. Berry, II4 N. Y. Supp. 497, the court held that 
under its inherent powers as a court of equity it would refuse annullment 
of a marriage to a guilty party even though the express words of the statute 
would seem to authorize annullment at the suit of. either party. The courts 
of other states, having general equity jurisdiction have, as a rule, granted 
annullment upon grounds of insanity, fraud and duress without statutory 
warrant. Avakian. v. Avakian., 6g N. J. Eq. 8g; Carris v. "Carris, 24 N. J. Eq. 
516; Powell v. Powell, 18 Kan. 371; Clark v. Field, 13 Vt. 400, In Davis v. 
Whitlock, 90 S. C. 233, the marriage was void under a statute and the court 
held that it had inh!!rent power to declare it so, as this would relieve the 
parties of the uncertainty as to their status, and remove any cloud from title 
which uncertainty as to mi1:rriage status might put there. 
BANKRUPTCY-ENFORCJ;MtNT oF LitNS AFTtR BANKRUPTCY.::._More than 
four months before bankruptcy the bankrupt gave ~ security deed to land 
which, after adjudication, the lien creditor, without the consent Qf the bank-
ruptcy court, sold at public auction in accordance with the terms of the deed. 
Held, that the sale did not divest the title"of the trustee.. Cohen v. Nixon & 
Wright, 236 Fed. 407. 
The filing of the petition is a caveat to all the world, and in effect, an 
attachment and injunction, Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 14 but only as 
to parties who have no substantial claim of a lien or title to the property 
claimed as that of the bankrupt. Until the property is in the custody or con-
trol, actual or constructive, of. the receiver in bankruptcy, or of the trustee, 
marshal, referee, or (after filing of the bankruptcy petition) of the bank-
rupt or his agent, it is not in custodia legis for the purpose of "assumption 
of jurisdiction" by the· bankruptcy court. See lli;MING'tON, BANKRUP'rCY, 
§18o7, for discussion and citation of cases. In re Rathman, 183 Fed. 913, 1o6 
C. C. A. 253; York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344 352, 353, 26 Sup. Ct. 
924 100 C. C. A. 253; Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 2o6 U. S. 28, 27 
Sup. Ct. 681, 51 L. Ed. 945; Jacqueth v. Rowley, 188 U. S. 620, 625, 23 Sup. 
Ct. 36g, 47 L. Ed. 620. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gaskell, 195 Fed. 865. Hence 
the statement in Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Co., 222 U. S. 301, 32 Sup. 
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Ct. g6, 56 L. Ed. 208, that the filing of the bankruptcy petition is itretf an 
assumption of jurisdiction is too broad. In the principal case the bankrupt 
was in possession after the filing of the petition, the property was therefore 
in custodici legis, and the sale by the lien creditors without the sanction of 
the bankruptcy court was void. In re Epstein, 156 Fed. 42, 17 L. R. A. N. S. 
465. The court in the principal case declined to foltow Hiscock v. Varick 
Bank, in which a sale by the pledgee, prior to adjudication and subsequent 
to the petition, was held valid, on the ground that the pledgee had had title to 
and possession of the pledged policies more than two years before the filing 
of the petition. As a matter of fact, the title of the pledgee was not that 
of absolute owner, but was almost identical with that held by the lien creditor 
in the principal case. The true ground of distinction would seem to be that 
the lien property was not in etistodia legis within the meaning of the rule laid 
down supra. The Hiscock case might, in the light of subsequent decisions, 
be criticized for its dictum that though the trustee's title vests as of the 
date of adjudication, it does not "relate back to the commencement of the 
proceedings in bankruptcy." 
BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF SUPREME CoURT.-A direct appeal was made 
to the Supreme Court of the United States from a decree of the Supreme 
Court of the District of Columbia, adjudging appellee not a bankrupt. On 
the ground that this case was not a "controversy arising in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings," the ·writ of error was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Swift & 
Co. et al v. Hoo11er; (1916), 37 Sup. Ct. -. 
The"mode of appeal in a given case depends upon whether the case pre-
sents a proceeding or step in bankruptcy or whether it is a "controversy aris-
ing in bankruptcy proceedings." Coder v. Aris, .213 U. S . .2.23, .234- In the 
latter case alone can there be an .appeal to the Supreme .Court of the United 
States as provide<!. by § 24-a, since Congress has "failed to give· an appeltate 
review in 'proceedings in bankruptcy' * * * from a decree with reference t<> 
an adjudication in bankruptcy." "There is a clear distinction between 'con-
troversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings' as mentioned in § 24a, and the 
'proceedings in bankruptcy' which by § 24b, the Circuit Court of Appeals are 
given jurisdiction to superintend and· revise 'in matter of law': the former 
being generalty held to embrace questions between the trustee, representing 
the bankrupt and his creditors, on the one side, and adverse claimants, on 
the other, and not directly affecting those administrative orders and judg-
ments ordinarily known as 'proceedings in bankruptcy' ; and the latter being 
confined to those questions arising between the bankrupt and his creditors 
which are the very subject of such administrative orders and judgments, 
from the petition for adjudication to the discharge, and including the inter-
mj!diate administrative steps, and such controversies as arise :between the 
parties to the bankruptcy p_roceedings as are involved in the altowance of 
cl:µtjls, flxing their priorities, sales altowances, and other matters to be dis-
pos~d of summarily." Thompscm v. Mauzy, 174 Fed. 6u. An adjudication 
of bankruptcy or a refusal to adjudicate, Denver First Nat. Bank v. Klug~ 
186 U. S. 202, 22 Sup. Ct. 8gg, 46 L. Ed. 1127; a judgment granting or deny-
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ing a discharge, Thompson v. Mauzy, 174 Fed. 6n; an order of allowance or 
disallowance of costs and expenses of administration-such as trustee's at-
torney's fees, Davidson Co. v. Friedman, 140 Fed. 853; a contest over a claim 
and lien, In re Loving, 224 U. S. 183; are "proceedings in bankruptcy'' as 
contra-distinguished from "controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings.'' 
If, however, the sole controversy is about the lien or priority and not about 
the debt, Coder v. Arts, supra (dictum), or if the trustee petitions for an 
order upon a third party, the bankrupt or bis voluntary assignee, to sur-
render property in their possession belonging to the estate, 11~ re H eco~, 164 
Fed. 823; Delta National Bank v. Easterbrook, 133 Fed. 521; Hinds v. Morse, 
134 Fed. 231 ; it is a "controversy arising in bankruptcy proceedings" claim-
ing property in the custody of the bankruptcy court Liddon & Bros. v. 
Smith, 135 Fed. 43; Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, and Armstrong v. 
Fernandez, 2o8 U. S. 324 in which the United States Supreme Court reviewed 
"proceedings in bankruptcy," are qualified and limited by the decision in 
Tefft-Weller & Co. v. Mun.mri, 222 U.S. II4 
I 
BANKRUP'tCY-P~Nct IN ENFORCJ<;M£NT OF -LmN.-More than four 
months before his bankruptcy A gave bills of site-of personaltY, of which 
he retained possession, as collateral security for indorsements by the pledgee, 
creating an equitable lien in the latter's favor, and within the four months' 
period sold the property and paid the proceeds to the pledgee. Held, that 
the enforcement, within four months -of bankruptcy, of a lien acquired prior 
to that period did not constitute a preference which could be set aside by 
the trustee in bankruptcy. Davis v. Billings (Pa. 1916), 99 Atl. 163. 
The enforcement of a lien obtained more than four months prior to the 
filing of the petition by taking possession and selling within the four months' 
period (Woods v. Klein, 223 Pa. St 256, 265, 72 Atl. 523, 524; First Nat. 
Bank v. Lanz, 202 Fed. n7, 120 C. C. A. 275) or by merely taking possession 
'(Gage Lumber Co. v. McEldowney, 207 Fed. 255, 262, 124 C. C. A. 641) does 
not constitute an illegal preference; nor -does an execution and sale within 
such period under a judgment recovered prior thereto, and operating as a 
lien on real estate (Owen v. Brown, 120 Fed. 812, 57 C. C. A. 18o}, nor tak-
ing possession where _required by the state law in order to perfect the lien 
as against third persons or the trustee (Thompson v. Fairbanks, 1g6 U. S. 
516, 25 Sup. Ct 3o6, 49 L. Ed. 577; Humphrey v. Tatman, 1g8 U. S. 93, 25 
Sup.-Ct. 568, 49 L. Ed. 956; Coggan v. Ward, 215 Mass. 13, 102 N. E. 336). 
But a lien created within the four months' period by levy, attachment, or 
otherwise is invalid under o§67f. Metcalf Bros. & Co. v. Barker, 187 U. S. 
165, 23 Sup. Ct 67, 47 L. Ed. l22j In re Ferguson, 95 Fed. 429. If the transfer 
is recorded within the four months' period and "-by law such recording or 
registering is required" (§6oa) within the meaning of Carey v. Donohue, 240 
U. S. 430, 36 Sup. Ct 386, and Bunch v. Maloney, 233 Fed. g67, it would, under 
the circumstances of the principal case, be voidable by the trustee under 
§6ob. Martin v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 228 Fed. 651, 143 C. C. A. 173; 
Deupree v. Watson, 216 Fed. 483, 132 C. C. A. 543. Recording of the instru-
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ment was not "required" in the principal case, hence this point was not con-
sidered. See IS MICH. L. Rsv. 6g and I4 MICH. L. Rsv. S78 for discussions 
of Carey v. Donohue and Bunch v. Maloney. 
BII.Ls AND NOTts:-AccoMMODATION Co-MA.KER NOT DISCHARG!U> BY Ex-
TtNsioN oF TIMr: oF PAYMJO;NT.-Defendant was an accommodation co-maker 
on a promissory note. Plaintiff, payee of the note, had knowledge of this 
relatibn when the note was made. In suit upon the note, held that under 
§§n9 and I20 of the N:EGOTIABI.JO; INSTRUMl';NTS ACT an extension of time 
granted to the principal debtor by the payee for a valuable consideration was 
no defense and would not release the defendant as accommodation co-maker. 
Graham v. Shepherd'(Tenn. I9I6), I8g S. W. 867. 
Prior to the N:EGOTIABI.E INSTRUMENTS ACT the general rule regarding co-
makers of a note was that one signing for the accommodation of another 
was discharged hy an extension of time given the principal debtor, if for 
value, and if the holder had knowledge of the true relation between the co-
makers. Ward v. Stout, 32_Ill. 399; Harris v. Brooks, ;<!I Pick. I9S; Hub-
bard v. Gurney, 64 N. Y. 4S7;.Barron v. Cady, 40 Mich. 2s9; White v. Whit-
ney, SI Ind. 124 This was on the ground that the relation of principal and 
surety .. exists between the accommodated party and the ac.commodation 
maker, at least so far as their own interests are concerned, and a holder 
with knowledge must "respect that relationship. Cummings v. Little, 4S Me. 
I83; State Bank v. SmiiJh, 1ss N. Y. I8S; Parker v. Ingrmn, 22 N. H. 283. 
But five states refused t<> allow the accommodation party to set up this de-
fense. Bull v. Allen, I9 Conn. IOI; Yates v. Donaldson, S Md. 38g; Anthony 
v. Fritz, 4S N. J. L. I; Farrington v. Gallaway, IO Oh. St. 543; Stroop V.· 
McKenzie, 38 Tex. 133. This almost universal rule of the common law 
based upon the equitable rules of suretyship as applied to negotiable instru-
ments has been overthrown by the Nr;cOTIAl!I.E INSTRUMENTS Ar:r, according 
to the decisions of the courts of the states where the question has arisen 
since the adoption of that la.;.,. They reason that, sipce a co-maker is by 
the terms of the instrument absolutely required to pay the same, he is ·a 
party primarily liable under §140 of the law. §u9 gives the methods whereby 
a negotiable instrument may be discharged; §120 those whereby a party 
secondarily liable may be discharged. The. defense relied upon by the de-
fendant in the principal case falls under §I20 and ~ot under §u9,· henc~ the 
defendant being primarily liable is not discharged. The courts have uni-
formly held that the methods of discharge specified are exclusive. Bank V· 
Williams, I64 Ky. 143, I7S S. W. Io; Union Trust Co. v. McGfoty, 2I2 Mass. 
20s, g8 N. E. 679; Bank v. Douglas, I78 Mo. App. 664, IOI S. W. 6oI; Rich-
ards v. Bank Co. 81 Oh. St. 348, go N. E. IOOO; Cellars v. Meachern, 49 Ore.· 
I86, I3 Ann. Cas. 997; Vanderford v. Farmers' Bank, IOS Md. I64, 66 Atl. 47; 
Walstenholme v. Smith, 34 Utah,· 300, 97 Pac. 329; Bradley Co. v. Heyburn, 
s6.-Jlash. 628, Io6 Pac. I70; CitizeM Bank v. Toplitz, 81· App. Div. S93, 81 
N. Y. Supp. 422 (affirmed in I78 N. Y. 464 on another ground, the court re-
fusing to pass on the question raised in the court below). In Iowa it has 
been held that when the question arises between the original parties to the 
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,iote, as in the principal case, the payee is not to be considered a holder in 
due course and therefore that the provisions of the NtGOTIAm.~ INSTRUMENTS 
Ac:r do not apply. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Snoufler, I39 Iowa I7(), II7 
N. W. 50. Three states, Illinois, Kansas,. Wisconsin, have refused to adopt 
§§n9 and I20 in the form recommended. See BRANNAN, NI!GO'l'. INs'.l'R. LAW 
(2 Ed.) 120, I58. '!'his law was not intended to state all the changes the law 
of suretyship might lead to in the law of bills and notes, and it has been con-
tended that the law does not necessarily upset the established rules of 
suretyship, BRANNAN, N:iiGOT. INS'.l'R. LAW (2 Ed.) n7, 26 HARV. L. R:iiv. 596, 
but in view of the almost uniform interpretation of the sections under con-
sideration and the purpose of the law as a whole, it would seem better to 
adopt the rule of the principal case and leave any needed alterations ,to leg-
islative amendment. See 5 MtcH. L. R:iiv. 683, and 8 MICH. L. IU;v. 6oo for 
a discussion of earlier cases. 
Bu.r.s AND Non:s-R.IGH'.rS oF DoN:iit oF A SUNDAY N~-A note was exe-
cuted on Sunday in violation of the Sunday laws, but was dated on a secular 
day. After maturity the payee of the note gave it to his grandson, who had 
no notice of the illegality of its inception. In suit .by him on the note, held 
the donee is entitled to recover, since as an 'innocent transferee he was not 
in pari delicto with either of the parties, and to'pemiit'the maker of the note· 
to defeat it in the hands of an innocent holder would allow him to take 
advantage of his own wrong. Gooch v. Gooch (Iowa Ig16), x6o N. W. 333. 
The making of a note on Sunday is a violation o.f the laws of Iowa, Sayre 
v. Wheeler, 31 Iowa IIZ; Pike v. 4ing, 16 Iowa 49, but such viofation does not 
make the note void but voidable. Mcintosh v. Lee, 57 Iowa 356, IO N. W. 
895; Collitls v. Collins, I39 Iowa 703. Where such vio1ation makes the note 
merely voidable it is· held that if the note appears on its face to have been 
made on a secular day a holder in due course may enforce it.. Clinton Nafl 
Bank v. Graves, 48 Iowa 228; Cra~oti v. Goss, 107 Mass. 439; Bank v. Thomp-
soii,-42 N. H. 370; Myers v. Kessler, I42 Fed. 73, 74 C. C. A. 62; Knox v. 
Cliflord, 38 Wis. 651, 20 Am. Rep. 28. And although the ·transfer is made 
after maturity, the maker has no equity against a holder for a valuable con-
sideration without notice, for it is only against a person in equal fault that 
the defendant can be allowed. to urge his own turpitude. L11ightman v. 
Kadetska, 58 Iowa 676, 43 Am. Rep. 129; Johns v. Bailey, 45 Iowa 241; 
Harrison v. Powers, 76 Ga. 218; Gordon v. Levine, 197 Mass. 263, 83 N. E. 
861; DANn:r.s, NtGOT. INS'l'. §70 (note). The court in the principal case 
extends the doctrine and,holds that since the transfer of the note by gift 
supported by the good, though not valuable, consideration of blood relation-
ship passed the title of the note to the donee, and as the latter acquired his 
rights without notice, the rule ex turpi causa non oritur actio will not avail 
to protect the wrongdoer, but he will be estopped to deny the validity of 
the instrument against the innocent holder when he by hi!! own act gave it 
such character. 
CoMMON LAW MAfuuAGt-N~SI'.rY OF CoHABI'.rA'J.'ION '.rO CoNS'J.'I'.rU'.rt.-
Plaintiff and defendant were married in New Jersey, without a license, by a 
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Justice of the Peace. After they had lived together about a week the de-
fendant (husband) left the plaintiff, who later brought a collusive suit as a 
result of which the marriage was annulled. The plaintiff now seeks to have 
the decree of annullment set aside. Held, that a valid common law marriage 
had taken place, even though a license is required in New Jersey, and the 
.decree of annullment was set aside. Davidson v. Ream (N. Y. 1916), 161 
N. Y. Supp. 73. 
Although parties are married without the license required by statute, the 
marriage will be valid if consummated, provided that the words of the statute 
do not expressly declare such a marriage void. State v. Bittick, 103 Mo. 183; 
State v. Parker, lo6 N. C. 7II ; Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173; Dmnaresly v. 
Fishly, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 368. •Many interesting questions were discussed 
by the court in reaching the above decision. The court said that a contract 
per verba de presenti is sufficient to constitute a valid common law marriage 
though not followed by cohabitation, and cites cases to support it. This is a 
disputed point. Many cases have said that the simple contract is sufficient, 
but the exact question has generally not been involved in the decision. The 
cases cited by the court in this case do not involve a decision of the exact 
question. In Jackson ex ·dem v. Winne, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 47, there was an 
actual ceremonial marriage. In F?nton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 51; Caujolle v. 
Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90; Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl, 57 Barb. 23s; Davis v. Stouffer, 
132 Mo. App. SSS; and Bey v. Bey, 83 N. J. Eq. 239, 90 Atl. 68S, it appeared 
that' there had bt;en an actual consummation of the marriage by cohabitation 
after the contract of marriage per verba de presenti. In Clayton v. Wardell; 
4 N. Y. 230, there had been cohabitation without a contract of marriage. In 
Mathewson v. Phoenix Iron Foundry, 20 Fed. 281, it does not appear whether: 
or not cohabitation took place after the written contract of marriage. The 
piarriage was held valid. In the cases sometimes cited to support the above 
proposition, Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391; Topper v. Perry, 197 Mo. 531; 
Port v. Port, 70 Ill. 484; Carey v. Hulett, 66 Minn. 327, there was cohabita-
tion either with or without a previous contract of marriage by words of 
present contract. Davis v. Davis, 7 Daly. (N. Y.) 3o8, presents the question 
squarely and a marriage was held to be valid, although the ceremony was 
not sufficient to constitute a statutory marriage, nor was it followed by co-
habitation. Herd v. Herd, 6g So. 88S, 14 MICH. L. Rsv. 26o reaches an op-
posite conclusion and a marriage ceremony performed after secus:ing an in-
valid license and not followed by cohabitation was held not to constitute a 
marriage. Ashley v. State, 109 Ala. 48, also reaches the same conclusion upon 
similar facts. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DSFRAUDING GoVllRNM£NT.-Accused obtained a. con-
tract from the manager of the commissary department of the Panama Rail-
road Company to supply said company with a certain quantity of tobacco 
anc!.agreed to and did pay over to the manager one-half of the profits which 
he had made through the contract. Defendant was indicted under §37 of 
Penal Code (Act March 4. 1909, c. 321, 3S Stat. log6, Comp. St. 1913 §10201), 
which provides : "If two or more persons conspire either to commit any of-
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fense against the United States or to defraud the United States in any 
manner or for any purpose and one or more of such parties do any act to 
effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to the conspiracy 
shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more 
than two years, or both." Held, that when the United States enters into 
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity, and is to be treated 
like any other corporation; therefore, though it absolutely owns the Panama 
Railroad Company, and is the only one profiting or losing by the railroad 
company's activities, a conspiracy to defraud 'the railroad company is· not 
a conspiracy to defraud the United States. Salas v. United States, 234 Fed. 
&j2. 
The case came up on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Dis-
trict, from the District Court for the Southern District of New York, where 
the defendant wa5 convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States. 
United States v. Burke, et al., 221 Fed. IOI4- Upon appeal, the Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court, finding that there 
was no conspiracy to commit~ any offense against the United States. In 
arriving at this conclusion the court relied strongly on the case of Bank 
of United States v. Plantet's Bank, 9 Wheat; 904. 6 L. Ed. 244. which had 
decided that a bank is not exempt from suit under the eleventh amendment 
because a part of its capital stock is owned by a state. In this case, MAR-
SHALL, C. J., in the course of his opinion stated, "It is, we think, a sound 
principle that when a. government becomes a partner in any trading com-
.pany, it devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, 
of its sovereign character and takes that of a private citizen." Thus, in 
reliance on the preceding case, it has been held that the fa~ tliat South 
Carolina was a member of a certain railroad company did not oust the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, Louisville R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 
550, 551, II L. Ed. 375; that the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Company was not 
entitled, by reason of the state being a shareholder, to exercise any larger 
rights than were given by its charter, Brady v. State, 26 Md. 302; that debts 
due to a bank wholly owned by the state are not entitled to priority under 
an insolvency law, Fields v. Creditors, I Sneed.~·354- Two of the three 
judges, WARD and Co~ considered that the opinion of Chief Justice MAR-
SHALL in Bank of Unit~d States v. Planters' Bank, supra, might be relied 
on as decisive of the present case, that the United States in operating the 
Panama Canal was engaged in a commercial business and had abandoned 
its sovereign capacity, and therefore a crime against the Panama Rail-
road Company was not a crime against the United States. CHATFIEI.n, J., 
dissenting, considered that the Panama Railroad Company was a depart-
ment under the Isthmian Canal Commission, -an agency of the United States, 
and therefore defrauding the Panama Railroad Company was not a crime 
against a private corporation, but a crime against the United States. 
CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw-EQuAL PROTf:C'tION oF LAws-INTr:RSTATS CoM-
:MERC£.-The plaintiff railroad company is a consolidated corporation, exist-
ing by virtue of the consolidation, under concurrent acts of the states of 
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Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama, of three independent and distinct rail-
road corporations created by and formerly operating solely within the re-
spective states named. By the specific language of §12 of the Alabama 
RtvENUS Ar:r an annual franchise tax ibased upon the amount of paid-up 
capital stock is exacted of "All corporations organized under the laws of 
this state:'' On the other hand, the franchise tax exacted of "all corpora-
tions organized under the laws of any other state, nation, or territory, and 
doing business in this state," was based upon the "actual amount of capital 
employed in this state." Plaintiff in error sues to recover certain sums 
of money which it had paid under protest, having been ·taxed on its entire 
capital stock. Held, the tax was properly levied. Kansas City, Memphis 
& Birmingham R.R. Co. v. Stiles (1916), 37 Sup. Ct. 58. 
When the three distinct and independent corporations, each chartered by 
a separate state, consolidated under the laws of Alabama into one corpora-
tion, this corporation was as much subject to and dependent upon the will 
of that state as if the corpoiators had been citizens of the state. Ashley v. 
Ryan, 153 U. S. 436, 442, 14 Sup. Ct. 865, 38 L. Ed. 773; Quincy Railroad 
Bridge Co. v. Adams Co., 88 Ill 615. By receiving a grant of corporate exist-
ence from the state of Alabama, .the corporation voluntarily made itself 
supject to the laws of that s·tate and cannot now be heard to complain 
against an annual tax based upon the amount of capital stock of said cor-
poration. The Railroad Company r~ied on the decision in Southern Railway 
v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 30 Sup. Ct. 287, 54 L. Ed. 536, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247, 
in which it was field that an additional franchise tax imposed upon foreign· 
corporations and not upon dome5tic ones engaged in the same business,. 
was a denial of the equal protection of the laws. But here the state has 
made no arbitrary classification. True, the consolidated corporation owns 
property outside of the state, while many other corporations chartered by 
the state are doing solely an intrastate business; but a franchise tax based 
upon the capital stock is not thereby rendered arbitrary. Nor does this tax 
amount to a regulation of interstate commerce. Where a state taxes a 
foreign corporation, doing an intrastate and also an interstate business, a 
certain percentage of fts capital stock as a condition of continuing to do 
local business in the state such exaction may amount to an attempt to regu-
late interstate commerce. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. l, 
30 Sup. ci. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 30 Sup. 
Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed. 378. But this is not the case of a state demanding a cer-
tain tax from a foreign corporation as a privilege of doing business in the 
state; it is the case of a state taxing a corporation chartered undei' its own· 
laws, a corporation which had agreed to this taxation by filing its incor-
poration papers. A state has authority to tax a domestic corporation for 
the privilege of being a corporation, .and such a tax is not necessarily in-
valid because measured by the capital stock, part, of which may represent 
ca~ital not subject to the taxing po\'\er of the state. Kansas City, etc. R.R. 
v. Kansas, 240 U. S. 227, 36 Sup. Ct. 261, 6o L. Ed. 617. See also 9 MICH. 
L. IU:v. 555. 
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CoRPORATIONS-El1etCT 011 Smuuo:ND:eit 011 CHAR'n:R.-A voltintary unincor-
porated fraternal organization incorporated under the laws of New Jersey. 
Later the charter was voluntarily surrendered under the laws of that state 
and a new charter obtained in Pennsylvania. ·The Supreme Court of Penn-
.sylvania held that the former status of the organization was revived by 
the surrender of the charter. Schriner, et al. v. Sachs, et al (Pa. 1916), g8 
Atl. 724-
The same facts were presented before the Court of Chancery of New 
Jersey, which held that the former status was not revived 'by the surrender 
'of the charter. Doan v. Jones, et al. (N. J. 1916), 99 Atl. 192. 
The line of argument in the Pennsylvania case is that the act of incorpora-
tion merely gave a new form to the organization already existent, citing Com-
monwealth ex rel v. Heilman, 241 Pa. 374 (1913), and concluding from that 
premise that the slOughing of the corporate form did not destroy the organiza-
tion itself, but returned it to its former status. The New Jersey case points out 
that the corporation went through the statutory forms of .dissolution and 
concludes that both under the terms of the statute and '1the ad~quate con-
'ception of the effect of incorporation and the force of. dissolution" thei:e 
was a total determination of the organization except for the payment of debts: 
The court cites no authority. and expressly disapproves of :the Pennsyl\rania 
case, which was cited by counsel. The point involved seems a new one. We 
submit that the New Jersey court ·begs the 'question insofar as its decision 
is based upon the nature and effect of dissolution. There is no issue as to. 
the corporation being determined by dissolution, bu~ the point raised is 
what is it that is determined! In other words the Pennsylvania court prO: 
ceeds upon the hypothesis that incorporation effects a mere change in farm 
which process may be reversed, while the New Jersey court assumes that 
incorporation results in a progressive evolution of the very entity of the 
organization, which cannot be later made to wc,rk retrogressively. None 
,of the stock theories as to corporations precisely me~ts the situatiol} and it 
seem:? that an interesting field of speculation is opened up. · · 
CoRPoRATio~s-PnsoNAr. LIABILI'tY oF SToCKHOI.DSRS 011 UNRtGIS'.l'ERtD 
FoI®:GN CoRPORATION.-The defendants are stockholders in a foreign cor-
_poration which · had carried on business in the' state without having at-
tempted to comply with the statutory registration require.ments as to such 
corporations. The plaintiffs, who had been employed by the corporation, are 
seeking to hold the stockholders liable as partners for the amounts due 
them. Held, the defendants are liable as partners. Cunnyngliam v. Shelby 
(Tenn. 1916), 188 S. W. u47. 
It is almost universally held that, where a foreign corporation fails to 
comply with the statutory requirements of the state, its contracts are not 
void but voidable, and may be enforced against the corporation. The cor-
poration may not set up its non-compliance as a defense. Ins. Co. v. Rust, 
141 Ill. 85, 30 N. E. 772; Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 24 Oh. St. 67; Ins. Co. v. 
Simons, g6 Pa. St. 520. The instant case presents the question whether, 
having dealt with the corporation as a valid corporation, the plaintiffs ~ay 
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set up the non-compliance and deny the validity of the corporate existence, 
and thereby bold the stockholders liable as ·partners. The court reasons 
that the foreign corporation, having made no attempt to comply with the 
statutes, has no legal sanction to operate within the state and hence bas no 
legal existence within the state at all, and having none bas no standing be-
fore the courts as a corporation for the enforcement of any right, as the 
existence of the corporation cannot ibe recognized. Such being the case the. 
stockholders, having associated themselves together and carried on a busi-
ness for profit, are partners and cannot rely upon their corporate existence 
in another state as a cloak to relieve them of their liability as such. The 
court relies upon Taylor v. Branham, 35 Fla. 297, 17 So. 552, 39 L. R. A. 362; 
Mandeville v. Courtwright, 142 Fed. 97, 73 C. C. A. 321, 6 L. R. A. N. S. 
1003; Morion v. Hart, 88 Tenn. 427, 12 S. W. 1026; Carter v. McCfare, g8 
Tenn. 109, 38 S. W. 585, 36 L. R. A. 282. The weight of authority, how-
~ver, ~eems to support the view that the bare fact that a foreign corpora-
tion has not complied with the state registration statutes is not sufficient to 
authorize a judgment against the stockholders as partners Oil contracts exe-
cuted in the name of the corporation. Nat'l Bank v. Spot Cash Coal Co., 
g8 Ark. 59; Boyington v. Van Etten, 62 Ark. 63, 35 S. W. 622; Tribble v. 
Halbert, 143 Mo. App. 524; Merrick.v. Van Sanwoord, 34 N. Y. 208; Steph-
enson v. Dodson, 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 343; Bond v. Stroughton, 26 Pa. Super. 
Ct. 483; Leschen Rope Co. v. Moser (Tex. Civ. App.), 159 S. W. 1018. It is 
well settled that such liability may be imposed upon the stockholders· by 
statute, Kendall v. Bank, 19 Colo. 310, 35 Pac. 538; Hunnewell v. Duxbury, 
154 Mass. 286, 28 N. E. 267; Chesley v. Soo &c. Co., 19 N. D. 18; Goldsbe"y 
v. Carter, 100 Va. 438, 41 S. E. 858, and it seems clear that where the cor-
porate existence is effected in another state purely for the purpose of de-
feating personal li\lbility, such is a fraud upon the state which prevents a 
valid incorporation and therefore the stockholders may be held liable as 
partners. Cleaton v. Emery, 49 IMo. App. 345; Daviclson v. Hobson, 59 Mo. 
App. ,;30; Hill v. Beach, 12 N. J. Eq. 31; Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass. 
249, 19 N. E. 342. It has also been held that an agent who has actually en-
tered into contracts for such a· corporation may be held personally liable on 
the ground that the corporation, having no power to transact business within 
th_e state, can delegate none to the agent, and one whp undertakes to act 
for such a principal and represents himself to have such power when in 
fact be bas none, is personally responsible. M orl01i v. Haff, 88 Tenn. 427, 
12 S. \V. 1026; Raff v. Isham, 235 Pa. St. 347, 84 Atl. 352; Lasher v. Stinson, 
145 Pa. St. 30, 23 Atl. 552. In the absence of such a· statute and of fraud 
in the incorporation of the· company, and where the stockholder has not per-
sonally actively engaged in the actual business, it is not so clear that the 
partnership liability should be imposed upon him. It seems clear that the 
other party to the contract never intended to look to him in case of any 
damage or loss resulting. When be entered into the contract it was the 
c~~l>oration as such that he had in mind. He has his remedy against the 
corporatfon on the contract either in his own state as shown above or-
contract actions be:ing transitory-in the courts of the parent state of the 
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corporation. Non-compliance of the corporation in no .way affects the 
validity of the existence of the corporation, Rough. v. Breitung, n7 Mich. 
48, 75 N. W. 147, and a corporate franchise granted by one state may not be 
revoked or annulled by the courts of another, Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 
supra. Hence it would appear that where a party has recognized the validity 
of the corporation by dealing with it as such knowingly he should be estopped 
from setting up its non-compliance with the registration requirements as a 
means to fasten a personal liability upon the stockholders of the company, 
unless there is a statute which strips the compant· of its corporate char-
acter. Mandeville v. Courtwright, supra. The above case was relied upon 
by ~he court in ~e principal case in coming to an opposite conclusion, but 
it should be noticed that it was expressly found that the plaintiff had no 
knowledge that she was dealing with a corporation, a,nd that the court makes 
no comment in reViewing the instruction of the trial court that if the plaintiff 
dealt with the corporation with knowledge she would be estopped to deny 
its power to act, and would be precluded from holding the shareholders 
liable as partners. Taylor v. Branham, supra, the only other cal!e concerning 
the liability of stockholders cited by the court in the principal case{ is an 
unsatisfactory report and it is not clear on what circumstance the eourt 
rests its decision. · · 
CouNTatCI.AI:r.i:-WHtN BARR~ IN EQUITY BY THE STATUTE oF Lni:nA-
TroNs.-Complainant was a stockholder in defendant corporation, and brought 
a bill in equity to compel payment" of his dividends and a transfer of his 
stock to his vendee upon the defendant's books. The defendant in its 
cross-bill insisted that the plaintiff pay to the !iefendant a certain counter-
claim, which, however, was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The 
lower court refused· to give effect to the counterclair and allowed the com-' 
,plainant the relief sought. Held, this decree should be reversed and case 
·remanded for new trial in which, the.counterclaim should be allowed: United 
Cigarette Mach. Co. v • .Brown (Va. 1916), 8g S. E. 851. 
In the principal case the defendant company had a lien on all its stock 
for the debts of the stockholders by virtue of a clause in the articles of 
incorporation. The fact that the Statute of Limitations has barred an 
action by the corporation on its claim will ·not destroy the lien upon the 
stock. Brent v. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. 596, 9 L. Ed. 547; Sproul v. 
Sta.ndard Plate Glass Co., 201 Pa. 103, 50 Atl. 1003; CooK, CoRPORATIONS 
(7th Ed.), §527· The decision in the principal case might have been put 
on this ground alone. How:ever, the court assigns a,s an additional reason 
for giving effect to the counterclaim, the principle of equity, soml'times ex-
pressed in the maxim, "He who seeks equity· must' do equity." If relief is 
granted on this theory, the existence of the defendant's lien .is immaterial. 
In case the plaintiff brings an action at law, a counterclaim or set-off barred 
by the Statute 'of Limitations is inadmissible. Taylor v. Gould, 57 Pa. St. 152, 
WATS.MAN, SET-OFF (2nd Ed.), §99. The rule is different in equity; if 
there is an equitable right to which the defendant is entitled, the court will 
make it a condition precedent to the granting of the relief sought by the 
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complainant that he should grant to the defendant such equitable relief even 
though there is no right at common law. This principle is applicable to cases 
in equity in which the Statute of Limitations has barred the debt or claim 
which the defendant seek~ to use as a set-off. Dewalsh v. Braman, I6o l11. 
4I5, 43 N. E.; Tracy v. Wheeler, IS N. D. 248, I07 N. W. 68. It would ap-
pear then that the counterclaim should be given effect in equity regardless 
of the lien of the defendant company. -
CRIMINAL LAW-INntFINITS SusPSNSION oF StN'ttN~-'the accused, 
pleading guilty to an indictment for embezzlement, was sentenced to im-
prisonment in -the penitentiary for five years, the shortest .term which could 
be imposed upon him. At his reque5t, the court ordered "that the execution 
of the sentence be, and it is hereby suspended during the good behavior of 
the defendant, and for the purpose of this case this term of this court is 
kept open for five years." Held, that mand~mus should issue directing the 
judge to vacate the order of suspension, such issue to be stayed until the 
end of the term to give ample time for executive clemency or such other 
action as might be required to meet the situation. Ex Parle United States, 
Petitioner, 37 Sup. Ct. 72. 
To Justify such indefinite suspension, it is necessary to find that a court 
has inherent judicial power ·to so act, either existing at common law or ex-
pre5sly given by statute. As there was no statute giving that power to the 
court acting in the principal case, the validity of its decision must rest upon 
common law principles. Decisions generally agree that a court has the 
power to suspend or stay the execution of a sentence temporarily, for a rea-
sonable time, pending an 1appeal, to allow the defendant to move for a new 
trial, or for similar reasons, some of the holdings ·being based expressly on 
a common law right. However, there is a direct conflict as to the right of 
a court to suspend sentence indefinitely, the better rule and weight of author-
ity apparently supporting the ruling of the principal case. For complete 
citation of authorities on both sides of the question see-14 L. R A. 285,: 
Note; 33 L. R A. N. S. u2, Note; 39 L. R A. N. S. 242, Note; L. R. A.' 
19I5C n6g, Note. ' 
EvmtNCS-Ntctssr'l'Y FOR ConoBORA'tION IN DrvoRCS AC'tION.~Flaintiff. 
sued his wife for divorce on the ground of adultery, his testimony showed 
clearly that he and his wife had been separated for more than four years 
because of his wife's open misconduct in living with one Freddie as Freddie'~ 
wife. The court said, "The testimony in this case, if believed, and I see 
no reason to doubt its truth, shows that ihe petitioner has a meritorious· 
case," but there was no witness to corroborate the petitioner's statements,. 
and the court .refused a decree, saying, "It is. an inflexible rule 1n this state: 
that a divorce will not be granted upon uncorroborated testimony or ad-
mission of a p~rty to the suit. Not only does this apply to the cause but to 
ev.~ element in the proofs necessary to sustain it." Garrett v. • Garrett 
(N:). 19I6), g8 Atl. 848. 
It was the practice in the Ecclesiastical Courts, the source of our common 
law of divorce, that no divorce -could be granted on the uncorroborated con-
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fession or admissions of the parties, owing to the danger of fraud and 
<:allusion or of coercion on the part of the husband.. This rule has been 
generally adopted in this country either by the courts or by statute. The 
New Jersey Courts have held to the doctrine in the instant case, that under 
no consideration will a divorce be granted unles!I petitioner's testimony is 
corroborated, but corroboration may :be made by the testimony of the de-
fendant, when clear and manifestly without collision. Hague v. Hague (N.· J. 
Eq.), g6 Atl. 579. Williams v. Williams, 78 N. J. Eq. 13, 85 Atl. 6u. Though 
some cases seem to hold that it is sufficient corroboration if the circum-
stances, as shown by the expressions and conduct of the defendant,. sustain 
the petitioner's testimony without any other witnesses. · Foote v. Foote, 71 
N. J. Eq. 273, 65 Atl. 205. Where other circumstances show there can be 
no collusion, or where the defendant vigorously fights· the case, so as to 
leave no doubt as"-to the truth of the confession, or where confessions are 
made under conditions precluding suspicion of collusion, the reason for 
the rule demanding corroboration fails and most co1ttts give a decree in 
accordance with Foote v. Foote, supra, even in states where statutes re-
quire corroboration, on the basis that where the statutes are in affirmance 
of common law they are to be construed as was the rule at common law. 
Burke v. Burke, 44 Kan. 307, 24 Pac. 466, 21 km. St. Rep. 283. The New 
Jersey Courts go further than other courts in that they require corroborat-
ing evidence to every necessary element in the proofs, while other courts 
hold it sufficient if the corroborating evidence tends to suppo"1 the com-
plaint. Williams v. Williams, Bx N. J. Eq. 17~ 85 Atl. 6u; Hertz v. H.ertz, 
126 Minn. 65, 147 N. W. 825; Allen v. Allen, 188 Mich. 532, 155 N. W. 488. 
EvmtNCt--Rss G!lsTA£ IN .AlloRTioN.-On trial for abortion, it appeared 
that the deceased woman went to defendant's home on February 7th, and 
stayed till February 13th, when she returned to her mother's home; she re-
turned to the defendant's home on February 15th and died there February 
17th. The mother was allowed to testify to the declarations made by the 
deceased on February 14th as to the - treatment given by defendant. The 
lower court said to the jury, "if the abortion was complete at the time of 
the declaration it was without probative effect; but if the abortion was at 
the time incomplete it could be considered as a part of the res gestae." Held, 
that the instruction was correct. State v. Newell (Minn •. 1916), 159 N. 
W.829. . 
The case agrees in result with the majority of the decisions,-but different 
<:ourts have given different reasons for admitting such evidence. In State v. 
Hunter, 131 'Minn. 252, 154 N. W. 1o83, the court, admitting the evidence 
on the basis of res gestae said, "Such declarations under particular restric-
tions are admissible when clearly sho'V{n to be part of the res gestae," and 
quote from JoNss, CoMM. ON EV:, §344. as follows: ''This rule* * *is a 
law unto itself, consisting·of many of the ordinary rules of evidence, but 
primarily of relevancy; apparently setting at naught many of the excep-
tions, but in reality presenting a complete system of self-regulation to 
meet the necessities and demands of complete proof." To the same effect 
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is State v. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 Pac. 1II2, 63 L. R A. 902. In a recent 
Michigan case hearsay evi.dence of statements of the deceased made as she 
left the house to take a walk with the defendant were admitted as being 
verbal a,cts. The court said, ''We are of opinion that it was competent to 
prove her utterances made when she was leaving her home, and the neigh-
bor's home, on Tuesday evening, not as evidence of the fact that she met 
respondent, but as evidence of her intention to meet him, and explanatory 
of her purpose i~ going away. Her utterances were in the nature of verbal 
act,:;, accompaning the act of going away." People v. Atwood, 188 Mich. 36, 
154 N. W. II2. Another line of cases admit the declarations of the woman, 
on the theory of declarations made in furtherance of a consJ?iracy to com-
mit an unlawful act. A woman may conspire with others to produce an 
abortion upon herself, and the conspiracy being shown, her acts and declara-
tions. in furtherance of the common design are evidence against others en· 
gaged in the criminal ~ct, even though not spoken in their presence. The 
Supreme Court of Iowa says, "Though she may not be guilty of committing 
an abortion on herself, it is a crime for another to do so, and, if she con-
spires with others to perform the act, there is no escape from the con-
clusion that she is a conspirator, ~d her declarations in promotion o·f the 
common enterprise are admissibl~ .in evidence against another conspirator 
on trial for the commission of the substantive crime." State v. Cro/fMd, 133 
Ia. 478, no N. W. 921. In Solander v. People, 2 Colo. 48, the same doctrine 
was announced. The i:ourt. said, "She may be, and usually is, a party to. 
the iltegal-combinatioti to effect the abortion, and, as this is the ground upon· 
which the declarations are submitted, it can make no difference that she is 
not criminally liable for ·the act." Declarations made after the act is ac-
complished, except as dying declarations, are not admitted. People v. Hatz 
261 Ill. 239, 103 N. E. 1007; Re~ v. Thompson [1912], 3 K. B. 19, Ann Cas. 
1913A 530. . 
.INl!AN'l'S-BIIJ.S AND Nonts.-A millor was the payee of a note due upon 
the date of his becoming· of age. His father, with the infant's consent; 
endorsed the infant's name upon it and delivered it to the defendant, receiv-
ing the money for it. The defendant supposed the father was the owner 
of the note. The money was invested and lost. The infant sued to recover 
the note. No actual fraud was found on his part. The Nt:GO'l'IAllI,t INsmu-
HtN'l' Ac:r provides that: "The indorsement * * * of the instrument* * * 
by an infant passes the property therein notwithstanding that from want of 
capacity * * * the infant may incur no liability thereon." Held that the 
provision of 'the statute did not affect .the infant's right to disaffirm his 
contract of indorsement and that he' should recover the note, Murray VJ 
Thompson (Tenn. 1916), 188 S. W. 578. 
· This seems to have been the first time that the question as to the infant's 
right to disaffirm his contract of indorsement has come up since the passing 
of the NtGOnABr.i lNS'.rRU:MtN'l'S Ac:r. The court states that this Ac:r merely. 
settled the question as to whether the infant's indorsement was voidable or 
void as to which there was considerable dispute. STORY, PROMISSORY Nons, §78. 
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The NllGOTIAB~ INSTRUM£N'.I.' Ac:r makes the indorsei:nent voidable and not 
void. The court says the Ac:r was not intended to pass the property from 
the infant without the right of disaffirmance, and if the words were so 
construed the endorsee could keep the note as against the infant even if 
he knew the endorser was an infant when the note was indorsed. There 
are very few cases upon this point. In Roach v. W ootlall, 9r Tenn. 200, the 
guardian of an infant recovered a note from an indorsee when the in-
fant's indorsement had been forged, the court saying by way of dictum 
that the infant's indorsement is void. In Briggs v. McCabe, ZJ Ind. 327, the 
infant payee recovered the note from the maker who had collusively paid 
the note to the endorsee, it also appearing that the infant had not received 
full value for the note. The court said that an infant might disaffir\D an 
indorsement of a note without returning the proceeds or property received 
by him. However, this case is distinguishable from the principal case, for 
there appeared to be fraud as ·against the infant while in the principal case 
there was no fraud against him. Hosler v. Beard, 54 Oh. St. 398, holds that 
a bona fide holder of a note made by a lunatic is charged with constructive 
notice' of the maker's disability, and says the same is true of· an infant's 
note. McClain v. Davis, 77 Ind. 419, holds the same as regards the note of 
an epileptic. Where there is an infant indorser it does not preclude the 
indorser from recovering from the maker, even before the N~ IN-
STRUMEN'.l.'S Ac:r, Nightingale v. Withington, IS Mass. 272; Frazier v. Massey, 
14 Ind. 382. Of course the infant· may not retain the proceeds until after 
becoming of age and then disaffirm, Curry v. St. John Plow Co., SS Ill. 
App. 82. But in the principal case the proceeds bad been lost, and the dis-
affirmance appears to have taken place before majority. 
LANDLORD AND Tr:NAN'.l.'-Smuu;:NDr:R.-Defendant leased premises from 
plaintiff, but abandoned them before the -expiration of the term. ·Plaintiff 
notified d.efendant that the surren4er would not be accepted; that the 
premises would be sublet, and the rent applied in mitigation of the damages. 
Plaintiff relet in accordance with the notice, and now brings this action to 
recover the damages suffered in excess of the amount received from the 
new lease. Held, plaintiff should recover such damages a.ii were not ex-
tinguished by the proceeds from the "sublease." Rucker v. Mason (Okla. 
1916), 161 Pac. l9S· 
There is a surrender of a lease hy "act and operation of law" when trans-
actions have taken place between landlord and tenant which create a con-
dition of facts inconsistent with the continued operation of the lease. The 
granting of a: s~cond lease is such a· transaction. By its execution the land-
lord asserts control over the premises. The legal effect of such control is 
to deny the existence of the estate created by the old lease., The landlord's 
protests of a contrary intention canriot change the color of bis acts. It is 
the landlord who grants the new lease, not the defaulting tenant. To call 
it a "sublease'' is fictional. There is no legal principle which permits one 
to constitilte himself another's ag_ent in order to reduce certain damages for 
which that other may be liable. The decisions holding that these facts show 
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a surrender of the old lease are technica11y sound. Gray v. Kaiifman Dairy 
&c. Co., 162 N. Y. 388, 56 N. E. 903; Biggs v. Stueler,.93 Md. 100, 48 Atl. 
727. The late decisions support the principal case. The substantial effect 
of such holdings is to deny the right of a defaulting tenant to escape the 
consequences of his wrong by ·entrenching himself behind a sound legal 
principle invoked by an act which would result to his benefit. Levy v. Burk-
strom, 19i. 111. App. 478; Conner v. Warner (Okla. 1915), 152 Pac. 1n6; 
Baldwin v. Lampkin, 14 Ga. App. 828, 82 S. E. 36g; Contratto v. Star Brewery 
Co., 165 I1L App. 507; Zabriskie v. Sullivan, 8o N. J. L. 673, 77 Atl. 1075; 
Boardman Realty Co. v. Carlin, 82 Conn. 413, 74 Atl. 682. The landlord 
may protect himself in any jurisdiction by a stipulation in the lease which 
permits him to re-rent the premises, and at the same time preserves his 
right to recover any deficiency. But even here, the right to the sum due 
after abandonment is contractual, and not, strictly speaking, for rent. Man-
hattan Realty Appraisers v. Marchbank, 149 N. Y. Supp. 834, 87 Misc. 336; 
Grammes v. St. Paul Trust Co., 147 111. 634, 35 N. E. 820; Woodbury v. 
Sparrell Print, 187 Mass.¢, 73 N. E. 547. 
LIB~ AND SI.AND£R-WoRDs LIB!!I.OUS P£R S£.-Plaintiff and defendant 
were engaged in.the undertaking business in the same town. Plaintiff a11eged 
that the defendant printed and mailed to a man, whose wife was critica11y 
ill at the time, a card bearing these words : "Bear in mind our Undertaking 
Department.. Satisfaction guaranteed. (Signed) H. L. Hughes." Plaintiff 
sued for libel and the defendant demurred. Held, that the demurrer should 
be overruled. Hughes v. Samuels Bros. (Ia. 1916), 159 N. W. 58g. 
The usual test in determining whether words are libelous per se is : 
Are they such as to injure the plaintiff's reputation or his business? ToWN-
SH£ND, SLAND£R AND Lim:r. (3rd Ed.) 264- Judged by that standard the 
words here used, taken :by themselves, would not be libelous. Stone v. Coqper., 
2 Denio 293;. Bennett v. Williamson, 4 Sandf. 6o. They become libelous, 
however, because of the circumstances under which they were published, 
and because of the effect which the publication would natura11y have upon 
the mind of the person to whom a knowledge of the publication was brought. 
But, although it is doubtful whether the words here used would formerly 
have supported an action for libel, there can be no doubt that the decision 
is justified. ,Th~ court puts it upon the broad ground that ,any intentional 
injury of another, which cannot be justified, is a tort, and 1f the injury ia 
committed by means of written words then it is a libel. See genera11y: 
BIGl!I.OW, ToR'tS (8th Ed.), 297, .-298, note. See also, Wallace v. Bennett; 
I Abb. N. C. 478; Bassell v. Elmore, 48 N._;t. 561; Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. 
s. 225. < 
MuNicrPAJ. CoRPORA'tIONS-LIABn,ITY :E'OR N£Gr.IG£NCt-Pum.1c ~­
'tIQNs.-The City of New Haven under the permissive authority of its charter 
coi:ducted a Fourth of July celebration on a public green. The entertain-
ment included a display of fireworks. The plaintiff's 'intestate was killed 
by the expfosion of a bomb, a result alleged in the complaint to be due t~ 
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the negligence of the defendant. The latter demurred. Held, that the de.. 
murrer should be sustained on the ground that the city in holding the cele-
.bration was performing a governmental function and hence was not liable 
for a negligent performance, as the act was not in itself intrinsically danger-
ous. Pope v. City of New Haven (Conn. l9I6), 99 Atl. SI. 
That a city is not liable for the negligent performance of governmental 
duties in general is well ,settled, 2 DILU>N, MuN. CoRP. (4th E<h), §949· See· 
lS MlcH. L. Rr:v. l8o, 30 HARv. L. Rr:v. 270. put the fast that the duties 
are governmental will not excuse the city if the act is in itself intrinsically 
dangerous. Colwell v. Waterbury, 74 Conn. s68, SI Atl. s30; Speir v. Brook-
lyn, I39 N. Y. 6, 34 N. E. 727. It has been held that where a municipality 
has the power to give such a celebration as that in the instant case, if it is 
exclusively for the gratuitous amusement of the public the municipality is 
not liable. The aC::t in which it is engaged is solely for the general benefit 
and interest of the public. Tindley v. City of Salem, I37 Mass. I7I, so Am. 
Rep. 289; Kerr v. City of Brookline, 208 Mass. I90, 94 N. E: 2si. In some 
cases the city has been held not liable on the ground that the entertainment 
was an ultra vires act. Morrison v. City of Lawrence, g8 Mass. 219; Smith 
v. City of Rochester, 76 N. Y. so6. But,when a city maintains or author• 
izes acts which constitute a nuisance it is liable for the damage caused, 
Mootry v. City of Danbury, 4S Conn. sso, :29 Am. Rep. 703; Pennoyer v. Sagi-
naw, 8 Mich. S34; Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 36s; Vanderslice v. City of 
Philadelphia, I03 Pa. St. I0:2, and at least in some jurisdictions it cannot 
escape liability on the ground that it was performing a governmental ftinc-
tion. Sammons v. City of Gloversville, I7S N. Y. 346, 67 N. E. 622; Harl v. 
Union County, S7 N. J. L. 90, :29 Atl. 490. Accordingly it has been held 
where a city permits a public exhibition of fireworks in the city street the 
jury may find it to be a nuisance, and in such case the city will J>e liable 
for the damages resulting on the ground that it consented to the creation 
of the nuisance. Landau v.: City of New York, I8o N. Y. 48, 72 N. E. 631; 
S Peir v. City of Brooklyn, 139 N. Y. 6, 34 N. E. 727; ·Moore v. City of Bloom-
ington, SI Ind. App. I45, 95 N. E. 374- CQntra, on the ground that the case 
involves no element of the alleged wrong except neglig!!nCe, and the condition 
is not sufficiently permanent to constitute a nuisance. Kf!rr v. City of Brook-
lilie, supra. Where a city merely fails to prevent fireworks on a crowded 
street the cityds not liable for personal injury resulting. Ball v. City of 
Woodbine, 6I Iowa 83. City of M<1dtsonville v. Bishop, II3 Ky. xo6, 68 
S. W. 269, which has been cited to the contrary, is based upon a statute. 
A display of fireworks in a public park is not a nuisance per se but it is a 
question for the jury. Landau v. City of New York, supra; De Agrammonte 
v. Cit:v of Mt. Vernon, n2 App. Div. :2gI, g8 N. Y. Supp. 454 
N:£GI.IGI":NC$-OF Fr:RRYMAN.-Plaintiff's intestate, who was a passenger on 
defendant's steani ferry boat, was killed by drowning when an automobile 
on the boat accidently started, ran forward and knocked decedent into the 
river. It appeared that no practical barrier was provided by the defendant 
to stop ~e progress of a car when once started. Held, the question of 
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defendant's negligence should be submitted to the jury. Meisle v. New 
York Cent. & H. R.R. Co. (N. Y. 1916), u4 N. E. 347. 
This case is worthy of note, perhaps, principally on account of its peculiar 
facts, although in the Appellate Division the complaint was dismissed on 
the ground that there v.ras no evidence to justify a finding that the defendant 
was negligent, or that it could have anticipated the accident. However, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals is clearly right. A ferryman, like other 
common carriers of passengers, is not an insurer of the passenger's safety, 
but is required to exercise the highest degree of care, skill, and foresight 
to protect him from injucy. · Lo·uisuille etc. Ferry Co. v. Nolan., 135 Ind. 
6o, 34 N. E. 710; Wyckoff v. Queens Co. Ferry Co., 52 N. Y. 32, 34. II Am. 
Rep. 650. If the possibility of an accident was clear to the ordinarily prudent 
eye then it is not necessary that the defendant should have foreseen the 
particular method in which the accident occurred. Munsey v. Webb, 231 U. 
S. 150, 156, 34 Sup. Ct. 44, 45, 58 L. Ed.' 162; Washington & Georgetown R. 
R. Co. v. Hickey, 166 U. S. 521, 526, 527. It is the duty of a public ferry-
man to provide suitable guards, barriers and fixtures of all kinds for the 
security,of passengers. White v. Win.nisimmet Co., 7 Cush. 155; Whitmore 
v. Bowman, 4 G. Greene (Iowa) 148; Sanders v. Young, 38 T~ (1 Head) 
219; 73 Am. Dec. 175; Wyckoff v. Queens Co. Ferry Co., supra. 
PLEADING-SP~CIAJ, D~.s->rs~ AS 'tO SUNDAY CoN'tRAct.-In an action against 
a decedent's estate on a note made on Sunday, the defendant pleaded that 
the note was illegaL ' After the court had directed a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff, the defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment on pie ground 
that "it conclusively appears· from the evidence that if said instrument was 
executed and delivered by decedent, it was delivered on Sunday, March 
1, 1914" No objection was taken to the use of a motion in arrest for an 
error not apparent of record, but the motion was treated as a motion for a 
new trial and overruled on the merits. .lf eld, that the defense to a note 
that it was a Sunday contract was a special defense, within Cons SUPP. 1913, 
§ 3340, requiring such defenses to be pleaded, that it was not sufficiently 
pleaded. by the ·conclusion that "the note is illegal," but· the fact that it was· 
made on Sunday must be alleged, and that such defense cannot 'be raised 
for the first tim~ on a motion in arrest or ·for new trial. Rule v. Carey, 
(Iowa 1916), 159 N. W. 6gg. 
The same court has gone to the extent of holdi~g that a defendant who 
has not raised the issue in his' answer may properly be. denied leave to 
amend for that purpose pending the trial on the ground that "it is a clear 
case of a technical defense, provided by the statute in the interest of what 
is 4eemed public· policy, and barren of justice between the parties,'' and 
so not in furtherance of justice as required, by the statute relating to amend-
ments. Chlein v. Kabat, 72 Iowa 291, 33 N. W. 771. Other courts, ap-
par_ently without being so strict as to amendment, have followed the 11rin-
cipal case in requiring a special plea. Triphonoff v. Sweeney, 65 Ore. 299, 
130 Pac. 979; Raymond v. Phipps, 215 Mass. 559, 102 N. E. 905; Herndon 
v. Henderson, 41 Miss. 584; Power v. Brooks, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 204; Finley 
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v. Quirk, 9 l\finn. 179, 86 Am. Dec. 93; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fulling, 
49 Ind. App. 172, g6 N. E. !)67. On the other band, some courts have 
held that the defense may become available although not pleaded. Thus, 
in an action to enforce an alleged Sunday contract, the fact that defendant 
in his answer did not assert the invalidity of the contract because of its 
execution on Sunday, did not preclude him from thereafter availing him-
self of such defense. Pearson v. Kelly, 122 Wis. 66o, loo N. W. 1o64; 
Jacobson v. Bent::ler, 127 Wis. 566, 107 N. W. 7, 4 L. R. A. N. S. II51, II5 
Am. St. Rep. 1052. In Pearson v. Kelly, supra, the court said, "To entertain 
such actions would aid the parties to enforce agreements which are repugnant 
to public policy. Parties to such an agreement are deemed equally guilty in 
the eye of the law, and must be left to suffer the consequences of their trans-
gression, and meet with the disapproval of the courts in denying them the 
usual remedies of the law." In this case the defense was allowed on appeal. 
The holding in the principal case, that the defense of illegality arising from 
the making of the contract on Sunday is merely a technical matter of plead-
ing, can hardly be reconciled with the general rule that "in an action at law, 
where the defendant does not set up the defense of the illegality of the. 
contract used on, but such illegality appears from the ~e as made by 
either the plaintJff or defendant, it becomes the duty of the court, sua sponte, 
to refuse to entertain the action" ; nor with the corollary to that rule, that 
an appellate court will dismiss an action based on an illegal contract not-
withstanding the fact that the question of its legality was not raised in the 
trial court. Gravier v. Carraby, 17 La. 132; Cansler v. Penlqnd, 125 N. C. 
578, 34 S. E. 683. . 
RuLJ; IN SHJ;LL:ey's 0Ast.-A testator devised property to E. S. "and his 
male heir forever." On questions arising as to the effect of the devise to 
E. S., as to whether be took an estate tail, or a fee simple, or a life interest, 
it was held, that the devise fell within the rule of Shelley's Case rather 
than within the rule of Archer's Case, for that the words "male heir forever". 
were words of limitation and not of purchase. Silcocks v. Silcocks [1916], 
2 Ch. 161, 85 L. J. Ch. 464. 
Whether a situation was created by the will which brought the rule in 
Shelley's Case into operation depends solely upon what "male heir forever'' 
is taken to mean. Did the testator mean to describe a certain person as 
the purchaser or did he merely intend to grant the remainder by way of 
limitation to whomsoever should be the male heir of E. S.? This devise 
differs in several respects from the usual one upon which the rule in Shel-. 
ley's Case (1581), I Co. Rep. 93b, 76 Eng. Rut. Cas. 2o6, operates. It is to 
the heir rather than the heirs of E. S. Is this enough to prevent the opera-
tion of the rule? No, for in a will the word heir in the singular is primarily 
one of limitation and not of pui:chase. Richards v. Bergavenny, 2 Vern. 324 
23 Eng. Rut. Cas. 810. 1Archer's Case (1597), I Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rut. 
Cas. 146, was decided as without the rule in Shelley's Case, not only because 
the remainder was to the next heir male in the singular, ·but also because of 
the superadded words of limitation, "to the heirs male of the body of such 
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next heir male" which were regarded as indicating that the person who 
should be the heir was to ~e as a purchaser and so to become a ne.w stock 
of descent. Because the instant case is also a gift to the heir in the singular 
number the sole question should be whether there are sufficient superadded 
words of limitation, or whether ·there is such a change in the usual order 
of the words used as to indicate an intention that the testator meant some-
thing other than that the words ''male heir'' were used as words of limitation. 
Should the fact that he said "male heir'' instead of "heir male" make any 
difference. It has been held that these two phrases have precisely the 
same meaning. Blackburn v. Stables, 2 V. & B. 367, 35 Eng. Rut. Cas. 358; 
Doe d. Angell v. Angell, 15 L. J. Q. B. 193. Should the use of the word 
"forever'' take the case out of the rule of Shelley's Case? The court said 
it should not, relying on Fuller v. Chamier, L. R. 2 Eq. 682, 35 L. J. Ch. 
"772, which held that though the word "forever'' might create a fee "it is 
necessary that there should be a clear and distinct limitation to the heir in 
the singular number, with the limitation over to the heirs in the plural num-
ber, in order to show that the singular heir is made the stirps, and that the 
deseent is to take place from him." This rule would limit the application 
of A1'cher's Case to a situation entirely analogous, to cases in which prac-
tically the same words of limitation were used. It has been suggested that 
any form of words which indicates that the heir to whom the remainder is 
limited was to take a fee would invoke the rule in Archers Case, 9 Iu,. L. 
Rm. 586. But it is submitted that since in Shelley's Case too there was a 
gift to the heirs male of E. S. "and the heir male of the body of such heirs 
·male" the application of the doctrine of Shelley's Case as applied in Fuller 
v. Chamier, supra, is correct. See 29 L. R. A. N. S. g63, note. 
SALES-VALIDI'l'Y oF Bm:.K SAY.ES AC'J.'.-The New York Court of Appeals 
has declared the so-called SAY.ES IN Bm:.K LAW (Personal Property Law, 
§44 L. 1914. Ch. 507), making transfers of goods in bulk presumptively 
fraudulent, except upon compliance with prescribed requirements for notice 
to creditors of seller, constitutional-Klein et al. v. Marvelas (N. Y. 1916), 
II4 N. E. 8og. 
In Wright v. Hart (1905), 182 N. Y. 330, a very similar statute enacted 
in 1904 (L. 1904, Ch. 569) was held to be in conflict with those clauses of 
the Federal and State Constitutions providing that no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and that no 
s~te shall deny to any person the equal protection of its laws, in that the 
statute affected the liberty and property of a limited class of citizens by 
arbitrarily and unnecessarily restricting their right to contract for, bargain 
and sell a particular kind of property: The clauses in both the federal and 
state constitutions referred to in that decision have remained unchanged. 
Since that case was decided the validity of similar statutes has been upheld 
i[\.~ large number- of states, and by the United States Supreme Court in 
Lemieux v. Young, 2n U. S. 48g, and Kidd, Dater and Price Co. v. Mtessel-
man Grocery Co., 217 U. S. 461. In delivering the opinion of the court in 
the principal case, CARDOzo, J., said: '.'W,e think it is our duty to hold that 
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the decision in Wright v. Hart is wrong. The unanimous or all but unani-
mous voice of the judges of the land, in the federal and state courts alike, 
has upheld the constitutionality of these laws. At the time of our decision 
in Wright v. Hart, such laws were new and strange. They were thought 
in the prevailing opinion to represent the fitful prejudices of the .hour." 
The New York Court of Appeals is to be commended for frankly admitting 
its erroneous decision instead of blindly following it or attempting to dis-
tinguish the present statute from the earlier one. A failure of justice often 
results from the obstinate refusal of a court to overrule a former decision 
which is clearly against the weight of authority and reason. The attitude of 
the court of appeals in admitting its error may be compared to that of Lord 
MANSFI1"r.D. In speaking of that great common law Judge, ·Bm.tr:a, J., 
(Lickbarrow v. Mason, :2 Term Rep. 63), said: "It is but just to say that 
no judge ever saf here more ready than he was to correct an opinion sud-
denly given at Nisi Prius." 
S~FIC Pr:RFORMAN<:t~F CoN'l'RAC't TO AooPT.-The defendant's intestate 
apparently adopted the plaintiff and the latter was brought up as a member 
of intestate's family. Upon the intestate's death· the plait)tiff brought an 
action of specific performance claiming a share of the- former's estate. The 
d~ed of adoption was found to be void because of a formal defect; further-
more, it contained no promise to leave the plaintiff any property or to make 
her the intestate's heir. Held, that specific performance should not be 
granted. Webb v. Mcintosh (Ia. 1916), 159 N. W. 637. 
The right of inheritance can only be conferred upon a stranger by strict 
compliance with the adoption statute and so if the plaintiff claims as heir-
at-law, she must fail. Willoughby v. Motley, 83 Ky. 297; Re11s v. Drury, 
57 Kan. 84. But in the principal case the plaintiff evidently does not claim 
as heir-at-law by virtue of the adoption laws, but rather by virtue of an 
implied contract that intestate should 1 will a share of her property to the 
plaintiff, which contract the plaintiff seeks to enforce against the deceased's 
estate. An invalid adoption paper may be·evidence of such a contract Prince 
v. Pri11ce (Ala. 1915), 6g So. go6. Where there is a contract to leave one's 
property upon his death included in a defective agreement to adopt, the two 
contracts may be treated separately and the latter enforced, although the 
former cannot be. Starnes v. Hatcher, 1:21 Tenn. 330, n7 S. W. :219. Specific 
performance was granted against the personal representative of the promisor 
where the agreement in the adoption paper was that the child should in-
herit the promisor's property or be his heir. Kofka v. Rosicky, 41 Neb. 328, 
25 L. R. A. :207, 59 N. W. 788; Anderson v. Blakely, 155 Ia. 430, 136 N. W. 
:210. The two last mentioned cases evidently are decided upon the theory 
that the promise that the child shall "inherit" is equal to a contract to make 
a will leaving a share of property to the child. As to the point of the 
plaintiff's ability to sue upon the contract though not a party to it, see Craw-
ford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 78 S. W. 30, 44 I;. R. A. N. S. 773. The last 
mentioned case allows specific performance in case the agreement was only 
"to adopt," as in the principal case, upon the theory that the parties intended 
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that the act of adoption should carry with it the right of inheritance and 
that equity will consider as done what ought to be done. · There is at least 
,one case which supports the principal case in denying specific performance 
under similar circumstances. Albring v. Ward, 137 Mich. 352, IOI N. W. 
20+ Though supported by other cases, the argument in Crawford v. Wil-
son, supra, seems rather strained and metaphysical; its effect is to enforce 
a defective adoption agreement. 
SUBROGATION-TAXI>$ PAID BY MISTAK£.-Plaintiff, acting under a mis-
take of fact, paid taxes on defendant's land, and having vainly sought re-
imbursement from the owner, brings this suit to have his claim subrogated 
to that of the County. Held, an equitable iien should be impressed on the 
property to the amount of the taxes paid, and the land ordered sold in 
satisfaction thereof. Baranowski v. Wetzel, 161 N. Y. Supp. 153. 
It is well settled that an equitable lien may ar.ise, in the absence of ex-
press contract, to prevent an unjust enrichment. Assistance will not b(l 
given to an officious intermeddler, but where the act, from the result of 
which relief is sought, is induced by a clear mistake of fact, the party is 
not in any proper sense a volunteer, and this fact should rebut the trite 
objection to recovery in such a case as this. This case is allied to the situa-
tion which arises when one mistakenly improves the land· of another. But 
in that case there is serious danger that in enforcing an obligation upon 
the owner in the name of unjust enrichment the court would do injustice, for'. 
it may well be that under all the circumstances of his situation the owner' 
would not be actually benefitted to the extent· of the increased market value 
of his land, or would not be financially able to invest in improvements. Even' 
with the precauti.onarj provisions of the Betterment Acts, allowing the 
owner to elect to abandon his land to the improver upon payment of its 
value without the improvement, hardship may result to one who would pre-
fer to retain his land in its original condition. In this case, however, the 
owner would have lost his land if the' tax had remained unpaid, and 
the relief granted is ·in substance subrogation, the mere substitution of 
one creditor for another. These considerations make the case more nearly 
analogous to those where one b~ mistake pays. another's debt. A fair 
number of cases allow the one paying the debt to be subrogated to the· 
rights of the original creditor. 23 L. R. A. 120. The decision r<':tched in· 
the principal case seems highly just, and consequently good law. The judg-
ment is prop~rly in the form of a lien, and an order of sale because the 
taxes paid constituted a lien against the land. The few cases which have 
involved the CJC?.Ct question are . not in accord. A lien on the land was; 
given in Goodnow v. Noulton, SI Ia. SSS; Egbers v. Fisher,·73 Wash. 3o8,. 
131 Pac. rn28, and Childs v. Smith, SI Wash. 457, 99 Pac. 304 A lien was 
denied in Taylor v. Reniger, 147 Mich. 99, no N. W. S03, and Montgomery, 
v. City Council of Charle#on, 99 Fed. 825, 40 C. C. A. 1o8. A personal 
juilkroent was denied in Bateson v. City of Detroit, 143 Mich. s82, lo6 N. W. 
II04, and Homestead Co. v. Valley Ry., 17 Walt (U. S.), rs~. · 
